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Even people who are not really interested in economics cannot fail to be 
struck by two economic phenomena: the gap between rich and poor and the 
alternation of boom and bust. Over the last fifteen years most of what I 
wrote dealt with the first topic. Now the invitation by Leidschrift to write 
about economic crises gave me the opportunity to focus on the second one.  
In general a crisis, from the Greek krisis, is defined as any event that 
leads to, or is expected to lead to, an unstable and dangerous situation. That 
of course is quite vague. When it comes to economic crises, things are no 
different. The expression ‘economic crisis’ is used for unstable, disturbing 
situations with a (potentially) negative impact and covers a wide range of 
forms, intensities, and durations of disturbances with quite different causes 
and remedies. In ordinary conversation, moreover, the expression 
‘economic crisis’ is often used as more or less synonymous for ‘recession’ or 
‘depression’, whereas economists tend to distinguish between these terms 
and give them more precise, different meanings.  
I will not be too concerned about all these definitions and 
distinctions and use the expression in that very broad and open sense of an 
unstable, disturbing situation. As the reader can see for him- or herself, so 
do the authors who write about crises in this issue. They cover a very broad 
and diverse gamut of ‘crises’. Luuk de Ligt compares in his article two 
financial crises in Rome between the first century b.c. and first century a.d. 
Yaacov Lev in turn describes the Nile’s annual cycle and the structure of 
Cairo’s bread market and shows how food crises in medieval Egypt tended 
to be caused by either an insufficient rise of the water level of the Nile or by 
speculative withholding of supplies. Remi van Schaïk looks at short-term 
grain shortages in the Late Middle Ages, discussing their wider causes and 
consequences. Bram Hoonhout analyses a ‘subprime crisis’ in the eighteenth 
century, looking at the selling and consequent collapse of plantation 
mortgages in the West Indies in the 1770s. Jeroen Touwen analyses 
similarities and differences between the so-called Great Depression of the 
1930s and the current crisis in the Western world. The article by Rogier 
Busser takes us to Japan. It analyses two short-term crises in the 1940s and 
the 1970s and the almost permanent ‘recession’ that characterises the 
economy  





of the country over the last two decades. Finally, Thomas Lindblad analyses 
the financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Southeast and East Asia in order to find 
out whether and what lessons economic historians could learn from it. I will 
not present an actual introduction to the articles in this issue. They can 
speak for themselves. It would, moreover, feel somewhat patronizing to 
synthesize them on behalf of the authors and for the readers. I will try and 
present a general introduction into the topic ‘economic crisis in history’. To 
keep the topic, somewhat, manageable, I will confine my examples to the 
economic history of the Western world. 
 
 
Crises, capitalism and modern economic growth  
 
It is undisputed that advanced capitalist economies, in which markets play a 
fundamental role, have always known their fluctuations and instability. It 
would be quite miraculous if overall supply and demand would always 
directly and spontaneously equalize in such enormously complex systems. 
And even if they would, there is always in principle an unlimited amount of 
‘exogenous’ events: that is non-economic events, that might disturb 
economic stability like natural disasters, politics, wars, all sorts of human 
decisions. The distinction often made in this context between causes that 
are exogenous and endogenous, i.e. internal to the workings of the 
economic system, is relative and fairly arbitrary. I will nevertheless use it, 
again to make my topic somewhat more manageable and focus on those 
fluctuations that are (primarily) endogenous.  
 Most economists associate economic fluctuations and economic 
cycles with advanced market economies and distinguish between on the one 
hand economies with modern economic growth and on the other hand 
static, ‘traditional’ economies where the role of the market mechanism in 
economic life would be much less prominent and economic growth all but 
absent. Fluctuations of all sorts may very well have been present in 
traditional, pre-market, pre-modern growth economies but, so they claim, 
they were not endogenous to any economic system and therefore not really 














Source: A. Carreras and X. Tafunell, ‘The European Union Economic Growth 
Experience, 1830-2000’ in: S. Heikkinen and J.L. van Zanden eds., Explorations in 
Economic Growth (Amsterdam 2004) 63-88: 67. 
 
The sharp contrast, so dear to, for example, Karl Polanyi (1886-1964), 
between non-capitalist, traditional economies with exchange relations 
embedded in social relations and capitalist economies where the market 
mechanism functions entirely according to its own logic, is now considered 
quite exaggerated.1 Actually in capitalist societies markets are also embedded 
in social relations and to a higher or lesser extent regulated, whereas the 
market mechanism was never or in any case hardly ever completely absent 
in pre-capitalist societies. Differences in this respect are a matter of degree. 
As a rule, endogenous and exogenous factors both play a role in causing 
‘economic’ crises, be it in often quite different proportions.  
There continue to be good reasons to make a distinction between a 
world before industrialisation that was static and lacked modern economic 
growth, and a world with capitalism and in particular industrialisation, that 
is dynamic and growing. But here too one must be wary not to exaggerate. 
                                                     
1 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time 
(Boston 1944). For an analysis of his work containing many references to critics, 





In the very long run the pre-industrial world indeed hardly knew economic 
growth, certainly not the sustained, substantial growth we now call 
‘modern’. But as we will see, that does not mean it was motionless.  
What sorts of ‘crises’ does one come across in the literature? Let us 
begin our brief overview with the shorter ‘endogenous’ fluctuations that are 
so characteristic for capitalist economies and that are often, not very 
adequately, referred to as ‘business cycles’.2 They involve a movement of 
several fundamental economic indicators together and are usually measured 
by considering the growth rate of real GDP. 
 
Fig. 2: A business cycle 
 
 
Source: P.A. Samuelson, Economics. International Student Edition (New York 1967) 
243.  
 
Over time many such cycles have been identified or at least distinguished.3 
The most well known shorter ones are the Kitchin cycle, lasting about forty 
months and discovered in the 1920s by Joseph Kitchin (1861-1932) and the 
Juglar cycle, lasting seven to eleven years and identified in 1862 by Joseph 
Clément Juglar (1819-1905). Then there is the so-called Kuznets cycle, 
called after Simon Kuznets (1901-1985) that is assumed to last fifteen to 
twenty-five years. In all these cycles changes in investment play the key role. 
                                                     
2 The term is not very adequate as the fluctuations encompass the entire range of 
economic activity, not just business, and as they are not really cyclical, but it 
continues to be used. 
3 For an introduction see: C.D. Romer, ‘Business cycles’, The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BusinessCycles.html, second 
edition, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_cycle, accessed 3 May  2013. 




It is debated to what extent these ‘cycles’ really show a fixed, periodically 
returning and fully endogenous pattern. 
When it comes to longer wave-like fluctuations in economic life 
opinions are much more divided. That certainly is the case with so-called 
long Kondratiev waves or cycles that are supposed to last some forty-five to 
sixty years and that are called after Nicolai Kondratiev (1892-1938), a 
Russian economist who wrote about them in the 1920s and 1930s.4 Scholars 
do not agree on their actual existence and in particular their periodicity. 
Kondratiev himself regarded the ascendant phase of his waves as 
characterized by increasing prices and low interest rates, and the descendant 
phase by decreasing prices and high interest rates. Subsequent analysis 
concentrated on output.  
 




Source: T. Fanfani, Storia Economica (Milan 2010) 13. 
 
For Kondratiev those long waves were characteristic for the evolution of 
modern capitalism. His first wave started in the 1780s. There are, however, 
scholars who assume that long waves, not necessarily with the same 
characteristics or causes, existed already earlier on. They also call those 
‘waves’ or ‘cycles’ after Kondratiev or refer to them as ‘secular trends’, 
suggesting their upsurge and downswing together might last as long as a 
century.5 For such long waves one also encounters the terms ‘phase A’ and 
‘phase B’, originally introduced by French economist François Simiand 
(1872-1935), and initially referring to much shorter price waves in the 
industrial(ising) world.  
                                                     
4 For further information on Kondratiev and more in general on long waves and 
economic development, see: C. Freeman and F. Louçã, As Time goes by. From the 
Industrial Revolutions to the Information Revolution (Oxford 2001). 
5  Fernand Braudel, to some extent Immanuel Wallerstein, and definitely Andre 
Gunder Frank are amongst the scholars who think there were already Kondratiev 





Crises before capitalism and modern economic growth 
 
No one would of course deny that economic life has always been subject to 
all sorts of fluctuations, even when it was not dominated by the market and 
growth was still rare. What is debated is what caused those pre-industrial 
and pre-capitalist fluctuations, i.e. whether they were endogenous and 
whether they were periodic. Over the very long run the pre-industrial and 
pre-capitalist world was one of continuity and stability. 
 




Source: G. Clark, A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton 
2007) 2. 
 
Things, however, were quite different in the less-long run. Traditional 
economies not only suffered from the many forms of external disturbance 
that also impinge on modern economies; on top of that they suffered from 
the vagaries of nature to an extent that advanced economies simply no 
longer know. Nature – via e.g. weather conditions, climate, diseases of 
people and animals, the (non-)availability of resources – had a direct and 
often very disturbing impact on all levels of economic life. This meant that 
volatility and variety, and thus unpredictability, were all too present in the 




old economic regime in the short run.6 The following table can serve as an 
illustration. It shows fluctuations in the price of wheat over a brief period of 
time. Wheat was by far the most important consumer good at the time in 
France.  
 
Fig. 5: Short-term fluctuation. Wheat prices in Rozoy and Brie (France), 




Source: W. Abel, Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth 
Centuries (London 1980) 166. 
 
Most of such fluctuations will have found their origin outside the economic 
system. One should be wary though of generalizing too rash and suggesting 
that endogenous economic fluctuations thus are a very recent phenomenon. 
Historians as a rule distinguish between several types of crisis when 
discussing traditional economies. Probably the best-known variety is the so-
called crise de subsistance that figures prominently in the work of historical 
demographers. Such crises, that were quite frequent in most of Europe until 
far into the eighteenth century and only really disappeared during the 
nineteenth century, express a close relationship between the availability of 
food on the one hand and mortality and fertility (and often also nuptiality) 
on the other. 
 
                                                     
6 D.W. Allen, The Institutional Revolution. Measurement and the Economic Emergence of the 










Source: P. Kriedte, Spatfeudalismus und Handelskapital. Grundlinien der europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 16. bis zum Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen 1980) 14.  
 
That means they were considered part and parcel of the Malthusian 
dynamics that supposedly characterised the pre-industrial world. 7  Their 
frequent occurrence in the end was regarded as a symptom of 
‘overpopulation’, which led to food shortage, which in turn led to higher 
mortality. The impact of changes in price level and mortality on nuptiality 
and fertility seems well established. The relationship, though, between 
‘overpopulation’, food crises and actual increases in mortality appears to 
have been much weaker than scholars have long assumed. Overall, high 
mortality – in the short as well as in the long run – appears to have primarily 
been a consequence of diseases whose occurrence often was not or hardly 
                                                     
7 For a description of those dynamics that are relevant in this context, see the article 
by Clark referred to in note 21. 




related to what went on in the economy or to changes in population size.8 
This would mean that the prime mover of such crises as far as they were 
‘crises of mortality’ was to a large extent external to the economy. In as far 
as they were ‘crises of scarcity’, they could be related to ‘overpopulation’, 
but also of course to other factors like weather or war. 
The so-called crise de type ancien, a crisis of underproduction that 
figures prominently in the work of French economic historian Ernest 
Labrousse (1895-1988), overall looks more like a direct consequence of the 
internal logic of traditional economies. Labrousse postulated a correlation 
between high food prices and ‘recession’ in the rest of the economy, in 
particular a steep drop in the sale of manufactured goods.9  
 




Source: P. Kriedte, Spatfeudalismus und Handelskapital. Grundlinien der europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 16. bis zum Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen 1980) 22. 
 
                                                     
8  M. Livi-Bacci, Population and Nutrition: an Essay on European Demographic History 
(Cambridge 1990; originally Bologna 1987) 73-77. 
9 E. Labrousse, Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIIIe siècle 
(Paris 1933) and idem, La crise de l’économie française à la fin de l’Ancien Régime et au début 





Here too the actual trigger was often ‘nature’ or some event outside the 
economy proper. But the chain of events that was then set in motion can 
only be understood with reference to the functioning of the existing 
economic system. Such crises occurred so frequently and had such an 
impact because a very high proportion of total income of ordinary 
consumers had to be spent on food. In early modern Europe this could 
amount to as much as 60 to 80 per cent. A small decline in the supply of 
food already led to a substantial increase in its price and then a sharp fall in 
the demand for manufactured goods.  
 





Source: B. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe, 500-1850 
(London 1963) 118.10  
 
Volatility, however, during the economic ancien régime was not just 
characteristic for the sphere of production in agriculture and manufacturing. 
Many crises were monetary or more broadly, financial in origin. The stock 
and supply of money for a very long time were tightly connected to the 
stock and supply of the materials that functioned as or guaranteed money. 
                                                     
10 For further information on King see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gregory_King, accessed 28 May 2013. 




In Europe, that as a rule meant precious metals. This had some obvious 
disadvantages: it made economies dependent on the actual availability of 
those metals which could be in short supply, were not always easy and safe 
to transport and were subject to wear and tear. It is not by accident – and 
not irrational – that so many people, in particular people in government, 
often were obsessed with its imports and exports.  
In principle there were also advantages to this close identification of 
money with bullion. It was, at least in principle, much clearer what money 
was and how much of it there was than it is nowadays. It was much more 
tangible. Such a situation does not provide much room for manipulation. At 
least so it seems. Actually, manipulation, speculation and lack of 
transparency were rife. Many people using coins clipped them by shaving 
metal from their circumference or sweated them by shaking them in a bag 
and collecting the dust worn off. And there was debasement by rulers who 
reduced their silver or gold content. This tends to increase the available 
amount of money in circulation, which normally leads to rising prices, 
which in turn reduces the purchasing power of the currency but makes 
debts less burdensome for the government. That also profited from the fact 
that debasement led to re-coinage. Having new coins minted at the Mint of 
the sovereign cost money, the so-called seigniorage, that took the form of a 
difference between the face value and the commodity value of a coin. With 
only very few exceptions, the main ones being the pound sterling since 
about 1550 and the Dutch florin since about 1600, the silver value of 
moneys of account in early modern Europe decreased sharply.11  
Actually the world of money has always been a world of 
manipulation, speculation, manias, panics, and follies, and thus of crises. 
That is only too obvious for capitalist times, but it was also true for the 
world before modern capitalism.12 Let me just give one example (table 1) 
                                                     
11 F. Braudel and F. Spooner, ‘Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750’ in: E.E. Rich 
and C.H. Wilson eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. IV. The Economy of 
Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Cambridge 1967) 375-486: 
458.  
12  For a general overview of the entire period discussed in this text see: C.P. 
Kindleberger and R.Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(n.p. 2011) and C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries 





from the notorious Kipper-and-Wipperzeit in Germany, a period of 
financial crisis during the start of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).13  
 
Table 1: Exchange rate Reichstaler–Kreuzer 
 






End 1619 0124 
End 1620 0140 




From 1623 0090 
 




The history of prices as a history of crises 
 
Talking about money inevitably involves talking about prices that tend to 
function as a good seismograph of economic ‘activity’. The history of prices 
has always shown fluctuations and even severe turbulences. The following 






                                                     
13 See for an introduction http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kipper-_und_Wipperzeit, 
accessed 30  May 2013. 









Source: D.H. Fischer, The Great Wave. Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (New 
York and Oxford 1996) 4. 
 
Of course scholars have always been fascinated by such price waves, their 
causes and often disturbing effects. Not surprisingly many looked for their 
cause in the supply of money. For monetarist economists like Milton 
Friedman (1912-2006) who focussed on the working of modern capitalist 
economies, they became a matter of principle. 14  They, however, had 
predecessors who – which of course is of great interest to historians – saw 
similar mechanisms at work already before the nineteenth century. I will 
focus here on long-term fluctuations. François Simiand, a scholar who was 
                                                     
14  For an introduction see: B.T. McCallum, ‘Monetarism’, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Monetarism.html second edition, consulted 





quite influential in French historiography, made a distinction between 
prolonged periods of rising prices (phase A) and prolonged periods of 
falling prices (phase B). Two such phases together lasted some forty to fifty 
years. He claimed that such phases are clearly visible from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century onwards but already existed, at least in advanced 
economies, from the beginning of the sixteenth century and points out that 
the phases were much longer before the end of the eighteenth century when 
his in-depth analysis began. Phase A is characterised by great economic 
activity and a general rise in incomes; profits as well as wages. Its origins are 
to be found in an increasing supply of money. A shrinking supply of money 
is at the origin of phase B.15  
 Earl J. Hamilton (1899-1989), to just refer to another example, saw a 
direct connection between price rises in Spain, and soon also the rest of 
Europe, in the sixteenth century and the inflow of bullion from the 
Americas.16 That famous ‘price revolution’, however, has increasingly been 
attributed to other causes.17 The same has happened to the decline of prices 
that occurred during the seventeenth century. In Simiand’s perspective at 
least from the 1650s onwards, prices tended to decline, which he in the end 
considered positive for the economy. In the work of historians like Pierre 
Goubert (1915-2012) and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1929), the 
seventeenth century began to be depicted as an age of crisis with all the 
negative connotations of that term. For them the real underlying cause of the 
up- and downward movement of prices resided in changes in population. 
Lowering prices were a symptom and cause of economic retraction. Their 
demographic, Malthusian interpretation of long price waves, in this case 
                                                     
15 For an analysis of Simiand’s ideas see: F. Vayssiere, ‘Raison collective et progrès 
économique: la théorie du cycle de François Simiand’, 
http://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/81/78/54/PDF/2012-
06_VAYSSIERE_RAI.pdf, consulted on 4 June 2013, and M. Lévy-Leboyer, 
‘L’héritage de Simiand: Prix, profit et termes d’échange aux XIX siècle’, Revue 
Historique 243 (1970) 77-120. 
16  E.J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 
(Cambridge Mass. 1934). 
17 See not so much for the actual text as for the many notes and references: D.H. 
Fischer, The Great Wave. Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (New York and 
Oxford 1996) 70-90. 




truly secular trend movements, began to prevail at least in studies dealing 
with pre-industrial societies.18  
 
Table 2: The correlation between population and price level  
 
Period Population Period Cereal Price 
Levels 
1150-1300 Considerable growth 1200-1300 High
1300-1450 Serious decline 1300-1450 Low
1450-1600 Steady growth 1450-1550 Rising slightly 
 1550-1650 Rising steeply 
1600-1700 Standstill, or retarded 
growth 
1650-1750 Falling
1750-1900 Very rapid growth 1750-1878 Rising
 
Source: B. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe, 500-1850 
(London 1963) 113. 
 
This approach, in which technology and institutions are assumed to be 
more or less unchanged, was not only popular amongst the Annales 
historians just referred to. Already in the 1930s, German economic historian 
Wilhelm Abel (1904-1985) had written a major interpretation of centuries of 
Western European economic history that took changes in population as its 
point of departure.19 So did the Dutch historian Bernard Slicher van Bath 
(1910-2004) in a brilliant synthesis of the agrarian history of Western 
Europe from 500 to 1850. 20  It became mainstream. The majority of 
historians analysing pre-industrial economies still depart from Malthusian 
assumptions.21 In the Malthusian approach the relation between resources 
                                                     
18 P. Goubert, Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 à 1730. Contribution à l’histoire sociale de la 
France du XVIIe siècle (Paris 1960) and E. Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans de Languedoc 
(Paris 1966). 
19 W. Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur in Mitteleuropa vom 13. bis 19. Jahrhundert 
(Berlin 1935). There is an English version, to which I refer in this text: Agricultural 
Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries (London 1980). 
20  B. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe, 500-1850 (London 
1963). 
21 A very explicit defender of this approach at the moment would be: G. Clark, ‘In 
Defense of the Malthusian Interpretation of History’, European Review of Economic 





and population has mostly been interpreted in terms of tensions and crises 
as a consequence of major changes in the numbers of total population. One 
might also consider the economic consequences of demographic factors like 
the age-structure, e.g. the advantages and disadvantages of having a low or a 
high dependency rate. Or the fact that people have fairly typical spending 
patterns through their life cycle, which means that demographic 
phenomena, e.g. baby booms can have a clear impact on patterns of 
development.  
If indeed demography would be so important for explaining long-
term as well as short-term economic fluctuations in prices, production and 
productivity for the pre-industrial world in particular, the question what 
determines demographic fluctuations of course becomes paramount. We 
already referred to the availability of resources and to the role of diseases. 
Considering the fundamental role of agriculture in that world, one of course 
might also, for the long run, consider climate.22 
 





Source: K. G. Persson, An Economic History of Europe. Knowledge, Institutions and 
Growth, 600 to the Present (Cambridge 2010) 48. 
                                                                                                                       
those who reject the idea that the history of the pre-industrial world always is 
‘Malthusian’. See: K.G. Persson, ‘The End of the Malthusian Stagnation Thesis’, 
http://www.econ.ku.dk/europe/early-growth.htm, accessed 03 May 2013. 
22 B.M.S. Campbell, ‘Nature as Historical Protagonist: Environment and Society in 
Pre-Industrial England’, Economic History Review 63.2 (2010) 281-314.  





In industrial and post-industrial economies destabilising change has often 
been caused by shifts in investment, in turn caused by major technological 
changes. In the pre-industrial world technological change – as well as other 
kinds of economically relevant change – was so sparse, minor and slow that 
its short-term effects were hardly noticeable on a macro-economic level. It 
did not cause major destabilisation. Over the long term it only created very 
low growth and incremental change. The major general-purpose 
technological breakthroughs that really put an end to Malthusian constraints 
in producing food, shelter, clothing and energy, only emerged with the 
Industrial Revolution.  
 
 
Crises in advanced economies: causes 
 
In the end all economists agree that fluctuations are an integral part of 
(modern) economies. They do, however, fiercely disagree about their causes, 
remedies and severity. Mainstream economics long assumed markets would 
fairly quickly and ‘automatically’ return to a situation of equilibrium. Crises 
were just a brief disequilibrium or shake up because of a transient miss-
match between productive capacity and aggregate demand. In the longer 
run Say’s Law, stating that aggregate supply creates its own aggregate 
demand – which means that a general glut is impossible – would hold.23 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his followers of course disagree. They see crises 
as inherent to capitalism and unavoidable ‘considering the poverty and 
restricted consumption of the masses, in the face of the drive of capitalist 
production to develop the productive forces as if only the absolute 
consumption capacity of society set a limit to them.’ 24  This inherent 
instability basically is considered negative as crises succeed each other and 
the number of losers increases and that of winners decreases with every 
crisis. Joseph Schumpeter described modern capitalism as a ‘perennial gale 
of creative destruction.’25 Growth is the result of innovation. That has its 
                                                     
23 For this law called after the French economist J.-B. Say (1767-1832), although he 
did not really invent it, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Baptiste_Say, 
accessed 28 May 2013.  
24 K. Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy III (Harmondsworth 1981) 615. I 
here refer to the version published in The Pelican Marx Library, edited by Penguin.  





price and is disturbing but in the end crises would lead to progress. The 
originality of John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) resided in his view that 
insufficient aggregate demand can cause a situation of severe and long-
lasting crisis, i.e. a serious depression that will not be solved by any ‘invisible 
hand’. In such a depression people tend to neither consume nor invest but 
develop a preference to hold money as liquid cash. Government is therefore 
required to step in, e.g. by lowering interest rates, funnelling new money, 
giving tax breaks or starting public works. With the passing of time it was 
not just full blown Keynesians who were convinced of the necessity of such 
government intervention. For several decades after the Second World War 
almost all economists in the Western world held this view that was 
popularised by economists like Paul Samuelson (1915-2009) who created a 
kind of neo-classical-Keynesian synthesis.26  
The claim that monetary swings play a role in the emergence of 
economic fluctuations and disturbances is at the hearth of ‘monetarism’ as it 
is usually associated with Milton Friedman. He claimed he knew of no 
severe depression, in any country or at any time, that was not accompanied 
by a sharp decline in the stock of money, and equally of no sharp decline in 
the stock of money that was not accompanied by a severe depression: that 
is quite extreme. It is striking though, that at the moment the most popular 
explanation of the Great Depression of the 1930s in all probability is the 
monetarist one, that argues that it was caused by monetary contraction.27  
The explanations in the previous paragraph concern short crises and 
depressions. What about the long waves? As we have seen, for the pre-
industrial period, monetary, demographic and climatic explanations have 
been put forward to explain ‘secular trends’. In my view, overall, 
demographic explanations are the most convincing for that period, but in 
the end leave one with the question what explains demography. For the 
period since the beginning of industrialisation the most popular explanation 
for the Kondratiev waves at the moment seems to be a succession of 
macro-innovations in terms of general purpose technologies that led to 
booming and then flattening investment. That of course only makes one 
                                                     
26 See for an introduction e.g. J.O. Blanchard ‘Neoclassical synthesis’ in: The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition; Houndmills 2008).  
27 M. Friedman, A. Jacobson Schwartz and P.L. Bernstein, The Great Contraction, 
1929-1933 (Princeton 2012). For his claim about the importance of money for 
crises in general see: M. Friedman, http://books.cat-v.org/economics/capitalism-
and-freedom/chapter_03, accessed 7 June 2013. 




wonder what causes such innovations, whether there really is a periodicity in 
their occurrence and why.  
 







Is there any chance to eliminate crises? 
 
The death of ‘the business cycle’ has already been foretold quite often. 
Irving Fischer (1867-1947), co-founder of the Econometric Society and its 
first chair, in the 1920s thought that forecasters would be able to ‘predict 
business conditions in a truly scientific manner (…) much as we forecast the 
weather’ (sic) and that economists should be led ‘to control and reduce the 
so-called business cycle.’ His comment in the New York Times of October 
16, 1929 that stock prices had reached ‘what looks like a permanently high 
plateau’ shows he might have been rather optimist.28 Keynes was convinced 
that economics is a matter of uncertainty, but nevertheless is supposed to 
have said in 1927: ‘We will not have any more crashes in our time’29 and 
ventured a quite optimist long-term forecast: 
                                                     
28 As cited in: S. Nasar, Grand Pursuit. The Story of Economic Genius (New York 2011) 
301.  
29 He is supposed to have done so in a conversation with F. Somary in 1927, 






Let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that a hundred years hence 
we are all of us, on the average, eight times better off in the 
economic sense than we are today. Assuredly there need be nothing 
here to surprise us. Thus for the first time since his creation man will 
be faced with his real, his permanent problem – how to use his 
freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, 
which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live 
wisely and agreeably and well. (...) If economists could manage to get 
themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with 
dentists, that would be splendid.30  
 
Paul Samuelson, in all probability the most influential economist of the 
twentieth century and winner of the Nobel Prize for economics in 1970, 
wondered in 1967 what could be said ‘scientifically’ about the outlook for 
business fluctuation. He thought most economists would pretty much agree 
with the following formulation:  
 
Although nothing is impossible in an inexact science like 
economics, the probability of a great depression – a prolonged, 
cumulative, and chronic slump like that of the 1930s, the 1890s, or 
the 1870s – has been reduced to a negligible figure. No one should 
pay any appreciable insurance premium to be protected against the 
risk of a total breakdown in our banking system and of massive 
unemployment in which twenty-five per cent of the workers can find 
no job. 31  
 
It is interesting to see why he thought what he calls ‘depressions’ would 
disappear. He gave two main reasons:  
 
The electorate in a modern mixed economy will insist that any 
political party which is in power (…) will take the expansionary 
actions that keep great depressions from occurring. (…) 
[D]emocratic mixed economies are unlikely to experience old-
fashioned prolonged depression ever again (…)32 
 
                                                     
30 J.M. Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’, originally written in 
1930. I quote from the version in his Essays in Persuasion (New York 1963) 358-373. 
31 P.A. Samuelson, Economics. International Student Edition (New York 1967) 254. 
32 Samuelson, Economics, 254, 256.  




The other one is increased knowledge: ‘We have eaten from the Tree of the 
Fruit of Knowledge (…)’33 Samuelson clearly was overconfident. But he was 
not alone. In 1967 a conference was held in London to discuss whether the 
business cycle had become obsolete.34 
In 1997, three decades later, Steven Weber, a political scientist in 
Berkeley, fantasized in a widely discussed article about the end of the 
business cycle: 
 
The waves of the business cycle are becoming ripples. (…) Smarter 
government policy, globalization, changes in employment, advances 
in information technology, and emerging markets all cushion shocks 
and dampen the familiar boom and bust. The consequences for 
world politics and prosperity will be profound.35  
 
At that time, we also witnessed the rise of ‘new growth theory’ that claimed 
that we might be fairly confident our living standards would continue to 
improve. The Internet with its free information and global competition 
would push down prices. In combination with the fact that knowledge was 
becoming the main source of growth, that would end booms and busts. The 
most advanced economies in the world had become knowledge-economies 
and those, so it was claimed, no longer suffer from decreasing returns.36 In 
2003, to give one last example, Robert Lucas, winner of the Nobel-Prize for 
economics in 1995, declared that the ‘central problem of depression-
prevention (has) been solved, for all practical purposes.’37  
                                                     
33 Ibidem, 254. 
34  M. Bronfenbrenner ed., Is the Business Cycle Obsolete? (New York and London 
1969). 
35 S. Weber, ‘The End of the Business Cycle?’, Foreign Affairs 76.4 (1997) 65-82. 
36 J. Cortright, ‘New Growth Theory, Technology and Learning. A Practitioner’s 
Guide’, Reviews of Economic Development, Literature and Practice 4 (Portland 2001); M. 
Ridley, The Rational Optimist. How Prosperity Evolves (London 2011) and D. Warsh, 
Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations. A Story of Economic Discovery (New York and 
London 2006). 
37 R.E. Lucas, Jr., ‘Macroeconomic Priorities’, Presidential Address delivered at the 
one-hundred fifteenth meeting of the American Economic Association, 4 January  
2003, Washington DC: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/Taxes/Lucas%20priorities%20AER%2003.





All these predictions and many more have come to naught. Why do we still 
see serious booms and busts? There are more economists than ever. They 
have more influence than ever and like to suggest they are real scientists. 
Modern economies may be less suffering from the unpredictability of nature 
but they still are volatile, unpredictable and crisis prone. I see a mix of 
fundamental and practical reasons. Let me begin with the fundamental ones. 
Most economic decisions, not just the innovative ones, are as Keynes puts 
it, the result of ‘animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction.’ Much of what is going on in economic life, still in his words, is an 
effect of the ‘temptation to take a chance.’38 Every economic agent has to 
deal not just with risk but also with fundamental uncertainty. The word 
‘risk’ refers to measurable uncertainty with known probabilities, whereas the 
word ‘uncertainty’ refers to non-measurable, qualitative uncertainty with 
unknown probabilities.39 Individual agents who suffer from an overload of 
information and a limited amount of time cannot be perfectly rational. The 
concept ‘rational expectations’, so dear to many economists, means nothing 
as already shows in the fact that economists themselves hold so many 
different ‘rational’ expectations. We already referred to Schumpeter, who 
with good reason pointed out, that innovation is the essence and motor of 
any capitalist economy. Actually this applies to any developed economy. 
Innovating, however, is not a matter of calculating the known but of 
venturing into the unknown. Even the actions of those people who would 
like to be a perfect homo economicus are unpredictable, let alone the 
interaction between them. Macro-economic developments depend on the 
interplay of interpretations, expectations, hopes and actions of so many 
people and on so many occurrences, that no one can know the outcome. 
Macroeconomics is at best informed guessing. The economy is an open, 
indeterminate, instable system whose future cannot be deterministically 
predicted from within.  
Central planning by the state or some kind of all-encompassing 
institution will not save us in the end. Not just because the goals of the 
planners will often be incompatible with each other and will certainly 
encounter resistance. But also because, as Hayek has shown, much of the 
knowledge required for centrally planning an economy is inherently local, 
i.e. decentralized. Planners in a centrally planned economy will never be able 
                                                     
38 I took these quotes by Keynes from: J. Schlefer, The Assumptions Economists make 
(Cambridge Mass. and London 2012) 150, 159.  
39 See for this distinction: F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston 1921). 




to collect and coordinate enough information to optimally or even 
efficiently allocate resources. They lack prices that make it possible to 
determine scarcity and efficiency and are not able to rapidly adapt to 
changes and particular circumstances of time and place.40 Actually in many 
developed economies intervention by ‘the state’ has become part of the 
problem. Most governments are so involved in the economy and take so 
many measures – with intended and unintended, foreseen, unforeseen and 
unforeseeable consequences, often only to be succeeded by other 
governments that want to implement their policies – that government itself 
has become a source of disturbance. That effect is only enhanced by the 
fact that there is no global government.  
Let me now refer to some more practical reasons why fluctuations 
have not and will not become a thing of our economic past. Most 
consumers in the developed world have much more discretionary income 
than people have ever had before. This means they have far more room to 
choose what to consume and can also decide to postpone consumption and 
set aside large amounts of money. All that non-consumed money is then 
expected to find profitable investment. The amounts of money involved are 
enormous. Let me just give three illustrations. Gross monetary holdings of 
households and non-financial joint stock companies in Germany, Great 
Britain, Japan and the USA together, amounted to more than three times 
their total GDP at the end of 2010. In Europe in 2010, stock exchange 
investment amounted to 8,000 billion euros, i.e. some four times German 
GDP. In the Netherlands alone in 2012, institutional investors invested an 
amount of money some three times as large as GDP; some 900 billion euros 
alone were put aside for pensions.41 It will not come as a surprise that 
financial transactions are a manifold of real transactions. Currency trade 
alone worldwide amounts to 4,000 billion dollars per day. That is ten times 
all trade at the world’s stock exchanges. The value of transactions at the 
Wall Street Stock Exchange and the Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) 
increased tenfold between 1960 and 2010.42  
                                                     
40 See for this claim: F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse 
of Reason (Glencoe 1952) and idem, The Road to Serfdom (London 1944). 
41 H.-J. Wagener, Die 101 wichtigsten Fragen. Geld und Finanzmärkte (Munich 2012) 
148, 89; and http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/9E73B22E-1D7B-4AB2-BECF-
8C2E60EE9E91/0/2012beleggingeninstitionelebeleggersart.pdf, accessed 28 May- 
2013. 





The enormous increase in production and productivity makes the 
economy very prone to overproduction. Producers are now chasing 
consumers, trying to seduce them to buy via advertising and branding. The 
enormous increase in consumer credit is part of this chasing of consumers. 
Such credit has become a normal way of financing the purchase of 
consumer goods. Debt very probably has always been a normal part of life 
for many ordinary people, but for them at least, it long tended to be 
embedded in a context of personal connections and trust.43 Now it has 
often turned into an abstract transaction and a form of calculation. This 
leads to the fascinating fact that in many wealthy modern societies one can 
find mountains of debts as well as mountains of savings. To refer again to 
the example of the Netherlands: its inhabitants, as indicated, have not only 
set aside more than 900 billion euro for their pensions. But at the same time 
private debt in the form of mortgages alone amounts to 600 billion euro. 
Producing too has to a large extent become a matter of credit and total 
debts of firms are huge.  
Talking about credit means talking about money and money creation. 
Money has always been an extremely complex phenomenon at the origin of 
many crises and it has become only more complex with the passing of 
time.44 Cash money and current accounts in the Eurozone, so-called M1 
amounted to 4,700 billion euros in July 2011 which was only about half of 
the total amount of ‘money’ of which people in that zone could dispose of 
on fairly short notice. That is about as much as total GDP of the Eurozone 
at the time.45 Banks have always created money but they did so subject to 
certain restrictions of liquidity and solvability. Those, however, have been 
loosened over time. When the last financial crisis set in, many Western 
banks had only ten per cent or even less company capital. That may have 
increased flexibility but certainly increased risks and uncertainty. 
                                                     
43 C. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relations in 
Early Modern England (Basingstoke 1998). The broad synthesis by D. Graeber, Debt. 
The first 5,000 Years (New York 2011), is a fairly unmanageable mixture of brilliance, 
information and chaos. 
44 For the fascinating but quite complicated history of money, see: N. Ferguson, The 
Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (London 2008); more thorough and 
informative: G. Davies, A History of Money from Ancient Times to the Present Day 
(Cardiff 2002) and more introductory: C. Eagleton and J. Williams, Money. A History 
(London 2007). 
45 Wagener, Geld und Finanzmärkte, 43-45. 




Crises and the state 
 
Talking about debt, credit, and money, inevitably means talking about the 
state. States in the Western world as a rule have been heavily indebted from 
the moment they began to emerge in the High Middle Ages. Rulers did not 
wait for Keynes to start spending more than they had.46 The emergence of a 
complex finance sector in the Western world has from the very beginning 
been tightly interconnected with the emergence of states that needed 
enormous sums of money. 47  Strikingly enough two of the first major 
financial crises in Europe – the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in Britain 
and that of the Mississippi Company in France, both in 1720 – occurred as 
a company assumed the national debt of the country. Over the last 140 odd 
years government spending as a percentage of GDP has increased 
enormously. So did debts, at least over the last fifteen years. 
 
















                                                     
46 See for many examples J. Macdonald, A Free Nation deep in Debt. The Financial 
Roots of Democracy (Princeton and Oxford 2006). 
47 R. Bonney ed., Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford 1995); R. Bonney ed., 
The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe (Oxford 1999); M.D. Bordo and R. Cortés-Conde 
eds., Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World. Monetary and Fiscal 
Institutions in the 17th through the 19th Centuries (Cambridge 2001); N. Ferguson, The 
Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (London 2001); 
Macdonald, Free Nation deep in Debt; P. O’Brien, B. Yun-Casalilla, and F. Comín 
Comín eds., The Rise of Fiscal States. A Global History, 1500-1914 (Cambridge 2012). 
Country 1998 2007 2010 Country 1998 2007 2010
Greece 94,5 107,4 144,9 Italy 114,9 103,1 118,4
Portugal 50,4 68,3 93,3 Belgium 117,2 84,1 96,2
Ireland 53,0 24,8 92,5 Spain 64,1 36,2 61,0
 Netherlands 65,7 45,3 62,9
Denmark 61,4 27,5 43,7 Germany 60,3 65,2 83,2
Sweden 69,9 40,2 39,7 France 59,4 64,2 82,3





Table 4: Government* spending, percentage of GDP 1870-2009 
 
 1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 1990 2000 2009 
Austria 10.5 17.0 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 38.6 52.1 52.3 
Belgium n.a. 13.8 22.1 21.8 30.3 58.6 54.8 49.1 54.0 
Britain 9.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 43.0 39.9 36.6 47.2 
Canada n.a. n.a. 16.7 25.0 28.6 38.8 46.0 40.6 43.8 
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 49.8 51.6 56.0 
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 45.1 47.6 
Italy 13.7 17.1 30.1 31.1 30.1 42.1 53.4 46.2 51.9 
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32.0 31.3 37.3 39.7 
Netherlands 9.1 9.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 55.8 54.1 44.2 50.0 
Spain n.a. 11.0 8.3 13.2 18.8 32.2 42.0 39.1 45.8 
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 60.1 59.1 52.7 52.7 
Switzerland 16.5 14.0 17.0 24.1 17.2 32.8 33.5 33.7 36.7 
United States 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27.0 31.4 33.3 32.8 42.2 
Average 10.4 12.7 18.4 23.8 28.4 43.8 44.7 43.2 47.7 
*1870-1937 central government; 1960-2009 general government. 
 
Source: ‘Taming Leviathan. A special report on the future of the state’, The 
Economist, 19 March 2011, 4. 
 
Debt of course need not cause big crises. Great Britain had a public debt of 
some 250 per cent of its GDP after the Napoleonic Wars and that did not 
stop its take-off. But one cannot help wondering whether there must not be 
a level of indebtedness where it hampers growth and becomes a major 
problem. When it comes to public debt, economists Reinhart and Rogoff, 
experts in the field, very recently claimed that ‘across both advanced 
countries and emerging markets, high debt/GDP levels (90 per cent and 
above) are associated with notably lower growth outcomes.48 Some scholars 
came to a similar conclusion, whereas others who found errors in their 
calculations, contest their claims.49 Whatever the exact threshold, it will be 
                                                     
48 C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff, 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/growth_in_time_debt_aer.pdf 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010) 573–578: 578,  
accessed 28 May 2013. 
49 See S.G. Cecchitti, M.S. Mohanty and F. Zampolli, ‘The Real Effects of Debt’, 
Bank for International Settlements Working Papers No. 352, September 2011, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work352.pdf, who think that a public debt of over 




extremely difficult to do something about public debt even when one thinks 
it is too high. Welfare has turned into a right and the modern welfare state 
into a kind of addiction. Many millions of people have become stakeholders 
in over-spending.  
Adding up different forms of debt in the Western world leads to a 
frightening sum. Over the last thirty years, from 1980 to 2010, in eighteen 
advanced economies, the ratio of the added debts of households, non-
financial corporations and government to their added GDP is estimated to 
have increased from 167 per cent to 306 per cent.50 Total household debt in 
those countries in 2010 amounted to 90 per cent, their total non-financial 
corporate debt to 113 per cent, and their government debt to 104 per cent 
of GDP. In the Netherlands, to give one example, those figures were 130, 
121 and 76 per cent.51 The scholars who came up with these figures also 
indicate what they regard as a critical ratio of debt to GDP. For government 
and household debts, that would be 85 and for non-financial corporate debt 
90 per cent. Whatever the exact critical ratios might be: the current debt 
situation in the Western world is extremely instable and it fully escapes me 
how anyone can claim yet more Keynesian spending would provide a way 
out of this predicament.  
Increasing globalization has led to increasing interconnectedness, for 
better and certainly also for worse. Existing problems have only worsened 
by the global imbalances when it comes to trade flows, currency reserves 
and growth rates. The USA, for example, has an enormous trade deficit: for 
April 2013 alone it amounted to over forty billion dollars. China in turn has 
built up currency reserves that amounted to 3,300 billion dollars in 
December 2012.52 Europe will have to get used to a completely different 
                                                                                                                       
eighty-five per cent of GDP becomes a drag on economic growth. I consulted the 
website 28 May 2013. For the critique see: T. Herndom, M.I. Ash and R. Pollin, 
‘Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of 
Reinhart and Rogoff’. This text can be found on the website of the Political 
Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts. I consulted it 28 
May 2013.  
50 Cecchitti, Mohanty and Zampolli, ‘The Real Effects of Debt’, 7. 
51 Ibidem, 24-26. According to the Centraal Plan Bureau in the Netherlands, Dutch 
government debt in 2010 would have been sixty-four per cent of GDP.  
52 http://www.census.gov/indicator/www/ustrade.html and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-exchange_reserves, 





global order in which it will play the role of ‘sick man’ instead of shining 
example.53 The huge imbalances in the European Union and the Eurozone 
are not exactly helpful either and their impact is only heightened by the 
fairly disastrous decision to introduce a common currency in completely 
different economies and societies. That comment on the euro brings us 
back to money and finance. In the highly speculative sphere of money and 
finance, risk, uncertainty and unpredictability have always been even more 
prominent than in the ‘real’ economy. We have indicated that this sphere 
has now become bigger and more complex than ever before. The economic 
system of the Western world at the moment can very probably best be 
described as ‘financial capitalism’ and is basically unstable as e.g. Hyman P. 
Minsky (1919-1996) has pointed out. 54  The ‘normal’ dangers of manias, 
panics, follies, and fraud, can now have consequences of unprecedented 
dimensions. 
 Let me conclude: ‘It’s tough to make predictions,’ Yogi Berra, the 
American baseball player, is supposed to have said, ‘especially about the 






                                                     
53 P. Vries, ‘Decline of the West? – Rise of the East?’, Journal of Modern European 
History 11.3 (2013) 315-328. 
54 For information see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyman_Minsky, accessed 28 
May 2013. 
